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Abstract
We adopt the posterior-based approach to study dynamic discrete choice
problems under rational inattention. We provide necessary and sufficient con-
ditions to characterize the solution for the additive class of uniformly posterior-
separable cost functions. We propose an efficient algorithm to solve these con-
ditions and apply our model to explain phenomena such as status quo bias,
confirmation bias, and belief polarization. A key condition for our approach to
work is the concavity of the difference between the generalized entropy of the cur-
rent posterior and the discounted generalized entropy of the prior beliefs about
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1 Introduction
Economic agents often make dynamic discrete choices, such as whether to stay at home
or take a job and which job to take, when to replace a car and which new car to buy,
when to invest in a project and which project to invest, and so on. When making these
decisions people often face imperfect information about payoffs. People must choose
what information to acquire and when to acquire it given their limited attention to the
available information.
We adopt the rational inattention (RI) framework introduced by Sims (1998, 2003)
to study the optimal information acquisition and choice behavior in a dynamic discrete
choice model. In the model a decision maker (DM) can choose a signal about a payoff-
relevant state of the world before taking an action in each period. The state follows
a finite Markov chain with a transition kernel depending on the current states and
actions. The DM receives flow utilities, that depend on the current states and chosen
actions, and pays a utility cost to acquire information, that is proportional to the
reduction in the uncertainty measured by a generalized entropy function of his beliefs.
The DM’s objective is to maximize the expected discounted utility less the cost of the
information he acquires. We call this problem the dynamic RI problem.
The existing literature typically adopts the Shannon (1948) entropy cost function.
Despite many appealing features of this specification, the experimental literature in
economics and psychology establishes some behavior that violates key features of the
Shannon model (see, e.g., Woodford (2012), Caplin and Dean (2013) (henceforth CD),
and Dewan and Neligh (2020)). Motivated by this evidence, CD (2013) and Caplin,
Dean, and Leahy (2019b) (henceforth CDL)) propose more flexible cost functions.
While they provide solutions in a static setup given these cost functions, how to extend
their analysis to a dynamic setup is still an open question. The goal of our paper is to
fill this gap.
We make three contributions to the literature. First, we characterize the solution to
the dynamic RI problem using the posterior-based approach. To apply this approach,
we focus on the class of uniformly posterior-separable (UPS) cost functions proposed
by CD (2013) and CDL (2019b). Solving the dynamic RI problem is difficult because
the current information acquisition affects future beliefs, which in turn influence the
continuation value in a nonlinear way. The continuation value may not be concave
in the revised prior beliefs following any history reached with positive probabilities.1
1We can show that it is actually convex for the Shannon entropy case.
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By dynamic programming, the current choice and the continuation value are linked
by the Bellman equation. It is unclear whether this dynamic programming problem is
concave.
Steiner, Stewart, and Matějka (2017) (henceforth SSM) solve the dynamic RI prob-
lem in the special case of Shannon entropy using the choice-based approach. They first
transform the problem into an unconstrained control problem and then take coordinate-
wise first-order conditions to provide a dynamic logit characterization (Rust (1987)).
We argue that this approach does not work for general UPS cost functions. Our
posterior-based approach is built on the insights of CD (2013) in a static model and
takes into account the issue of joint concavity in a dynamic setting. We derive the
posterior-based Bellman equation using the predictive distribution as the state vari-
able. This distribution given any history can be viewed as the prior belief about the
future states at that history. It is revised from the current posterior through the state
transition kernel.
We reduce the dynamic RI problem to a collection of static problems using the
Bellman equation. The static problem in each period is to solve the concavification
of a collection of net utilities as functions of the posterior. Each net utility function
consists of the current net utility and the continuation value. It is critical for this
function to be concave for the concavification problem to be solvable. We show that
the overall net utility is concave under the assumption that the difference between the
generalized entropy of the current posterior and the discounted generalized entropy of
the prior belief about the future states is concave. This assumption is also important
for us to establish a recommendation lemma similar to those in SSM (2017) and Ravid
(2019), which states that the signal-based formulation with imperfect information is
equivalent to our posterior-based formulation with full information.
When further restricting to the class of generalized entropy functions that are addi-
tive across states, we provide a tractable first-order characterization for the dynamic RI
problem using the result in CD (2013). This characterization gives necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for optimal solutions. It reduces to the dynamic logit characterization
of SSM (2017) in the special Shannon entropy case.
Our second contribution is to propose a characterization of Markovian solutions and
an efficient algorithm to find such a solution. For a Markovian solution, the predictive
distribution of the next-period states depends only on the current action, the default
rule depends only on the last period action, and the choice rule depends only on the
current state and the last period action. Our characterization generalizes that of SSM
3
(2017) by allowing corner solutions and UPS cost functions.
Our algorithm extends the forward-backward Arimoto-Blahut algorithm of Tanaka,
Sandberg, and Skoglund (2018) to infinite-horizon models with discounting and to gen-
eralized entropy functions. This algorithm is based on the Arimoto-Blahut algorithm
for solving static channel capacity and rate distortion problems with Shannon entropy
in information theory in the engineering literature (Arimoto (1972) and Blahut (1972)).
Our third contribution is to apply our theoretical results and numerical methods
to solve some economic examples based on a matching state problem often studied in
the literature (e.g., CD (2013), SSM (2017), and CDL (2019a)). We show that RI can
help explain some phenomena documented in the psychology literature, such as status
quo bias, confirmation bias, and belief polarization. We find that the status quo bias
discussed by SSM does not arise when the decision horizon is sufficiently long. The
reason is that the probability of switching states in the future is getting larger if the
horizon is longer. Thus the DM has incentive to acquire new information and take a
different action. We also show that there is a positive feedback between beliefs and
actions when the state transition kernel depends on actions. This property is useful to
understand the preceding behavioral biases.
Our numerical examples adopt the Cressie and Read (1984) entropy function that
includes Shannon entropy as a special case. The Cressi-Read entropy function in-
corporates a curvature parameter that affects the marginal information cost, thereby
affecting both static and dynamic choice probabilities as well as the timing of choices.
We find that the status quo bias can occur earlier and the confirmation bias is more
likely to occur when the curvature parameter is smaller because it induces a larger
marginal information cost.
Our paper is closely related to CD (2013, 2015), Matějka and McKay (2015) (hence-
forth MM), SSM (2017), and CDL (2019a, b). SSM (2017) is the first paper that
extends the static model of MM (2015) to a dynamic setting and derives the dynamic
logit rule.2 Their solution method does not apply to the general UPS cost functions
adopted in our paper. We also extend the SSM model to allow the state transition
kernel to depend on actions. Our generalization permits us to study a wide range of
economic and psychological behavior.
Our paper is also related to Hébert and Woodford (2018), Morris and Strack (2019),
and Zhong (2019), who adopt the posterior-based approach to study optimal stopping
problems under RI with general information cost functions in the continuous-time
2See Mattsson and Weibull (2002) and Fudenberg and Strzalecki (2015) for related models.
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setup.3 Unlike their papers, ours is the first to study optimal control problems under
RI where the concavity of the objective function is important for the optimality of the
first-order conditions.
Most existing work on RI has focused on models with a continuous choice set,
which are typically set up in the linear-quadratic-Gaussian framework (e.g., Peng and
Xiong (2006), Luo (2008), Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009), Mondria (2010), Van
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010), Miao (2019), and Miao, Wu, and Young (2019)).
Woodford (2009) is the first paper that studies a dynamic binary choice problem under
RI (the problem of a firm that decides each period whether to reconsider its price).
Jung et al (2018) show that rationally inattentive agents can constrain themselves
voluntarily to a discrete choice set even when the initial choice set is continuous. See




Consider a T -period decision problem with T ≤ ∞ and time is denoted by t = 1, 2, ..., T.
Uncertainty is represented by a discrete finite state space X ≡ {1, 2, ...,M} and a prior
distribution µ1 ∈ ∆ (X) , where we use ∆ (Z) to denote the set of (probability) distri-
butions on any finite set Z and ∆ (Y |Z) to denote the set of conditional distributions
on any finite set Y given any z ∈ Z.4 We also use a bold case letter to denote any
random variable such as x with its realization denoted by a normal case letter x.
The decision maker (DM) makes choices from a finite action set denoted by A
satisfying |A| ≥ 2. We can allow the action set A to depend on the current state
as in the literature on Markov decision processes (Rust (1994) and Puterman (2005)),
without affecting our key results but complicating notation. The state transition kernel
is given by π (xt+1|xt, at) , which defines the probability of any state xt+1 ∈ X given
any state xt ∈ X and any action at ∈ A for t ≥ 1. SSM (2017) show that one can
redefine the state space so that the state transition kernel is independent of the action.
We allow such dependence explicitly so that our model is more flexible in applications
and is also consistent with the literature on Markov decision processes (Rust (1994)
3The posterior-based approach is often applied in the Bayesian persuasion literature. See Kamenica
(2018) for a survey and the references cited therein.
4As convention we define a conditional probability P (C|B) = P (C ∩B) /P (B) whenever P (B) >
0; otherwise, set P (C|B) = 0, which does not affect our analysis, but simplifies notation.
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and Puterman (2005)).
The DM receives flow utilities that depend on the current states and actions only.
The period utility function is given by a bounded function u : X × A → R. For the
finite-horizon case with T <∞, we allow u to be time dependent and include a terminal
utility function uT+1 : X → R. SSM (2017) allow u to depend on the entire history of
states and actions, which can generate history-dependent solutions.
Prior to choosing an action in any period t, the DM can acquire costly information
about the history of the state xt, where we use xt to denote the history {x1, x2, ..., xt}
and xtk to denote the history {xk, xk+1, ..., xt} for k < t. More accurate information will
lead to better choices, but are more costly, with information costs to be discussed later.
As MM (2015) and SSM (2017) show, we do not need to model the endogenous choice
of the information structure separately. Instead we can reformulate the problem in
which the DM makes stochastic choices and signals correspond to actions directly. As
CD (2013, 2015) argue, we can also identify signals with the corresponding posteriors.
Thus we will focus on the model with stochastic choices. See Lemma 3 in Appendix D
for a formal discussion.














, 1 ≤ t ≤ T
}
.
The joint distribution of the state and action trajectories is denoted by {µt+1 (xt+1, at)} ,
which is uniquely determined by the initial state distribution µ1 ∈ ∆ (X) , the state














for any t ≥ 1. Set a0 = ∅ so that p1 (a1|x1, a0) = p1 (a1|x1) and µ1 (x1, a0) = µ1 (x1) .
Given a joint distribution µt+1 (x
t+1, at) , we can compute the predictive distri-
bution µt (xt|at−1) , the posterior distribution µt (xt|at) , and the distribution of an
action conditional on a history of actions qt (at|at−1) . Set µ1 (x1|a0) = µ1 (x1) and
q1 (a1|a0) = q1 (a1) . Following SSM (2017), we call qt (at|at−1) a conditional default
(choice) rule and the marginal distribution qt (a
t) of at an unconditional default rule.




























, t ≥ 1. (3)
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Equation (2) shows that the predictive distribution µt (xt|at−1) can be computed by
marginalizing the posterior µt (xt|at) over qt (at|at−1). Equation (3) shows that the fu-
ture predictive distribution µt+1 (xt+1|at) can be transitioned from the current posterior
µt (xt|at) using the transition kernel π.
Conversely, starting from µ1 (x1) , given sequences of {µt (xt|at)} and {qt (at|at−1)},






µt (xt|at) qt (at|at−1)
µt (xt|at−1)
, t ≥ 1. (4)
Then we can determine the joint distribution µt+1 (x
t+1, at) recursively by (1).




constructed above induces an ex-









where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor.
2.2 Information Cost
In a static setup we follow CD (2013) and CDL (2019a,b) to define a UPS information
cost function as follows5
CH (µ, µ (·|·) , q) ≡ H (µ)−
∑
a
q (a)H (µ (·|a)) ,
where H : ∆ (X)→ R+ is a concave function (called generalized entropy), µ ∈ ∆ (X) is
a prior distribution, µ (·|·) ∈ ∆ (X|A) is a posterior, and q ∈ ∆ (A) is a marginal distri-
bution that satisfies µ (x) =
∑
a q (a)µ (x|a). The term H (µ) measures the amount of
prior uncertainty and the term
∑
a q (a)H (µ (·|a)) measures the amount of uncertainty
after acquiring information a. The concavity of H implies CH (µ, µ (·|·) , q) ≥ 0 and the
value of CH(µ, µ(·|·), q) represents the magnitude of uncertainty reduction by observing
information a about the state x. The following specifications of H are interesting:
• Shannon entropy: H (ν) = −
∑
x ν (x) ln ν (x), with limν(x)↓0 ν (x) ln ν (x) = 0.
• Weighted entropy (Belis and Guiasu (1968)):
H (ν) = −
∑
x
w (x) ν (x) ln ν (x) ,
where the weighting function satisfies w (x) ≥ 0 and
∑
xw (x) = 1.
5See Pomatto, Strack, and Tamuz (2019) and CDL (2019b) for axiomazation of general information
cost functions.
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, 0 < σ 6= 1.









, α ∈ (0, 1) .






, 0 < η 6= 1. (5)
Shannon entropy is obtained as the limit (up to a constant) when σ → 1, α→ 1, and
η → 1. The Tsallis entropy and Cressie-Read entropy cost functions are observationally
equivalent up to a scaling factor. Formally, the Tsallis entropy cost function with
parameter σ is the same as the Cressie-Read cost function with parameter η = σ
multiplied by σ.
Figure 1 plots the Cressie-Read cost functions CH (µ, µ (·|·) , q) against µ (1|1) and
their first derivatives in the symmetric two-state two-action case with µ (1) = 0.5 and
q (1) = 0.5 for different values of η. Cost functions are convex. Functions with η > 1
have finite first derivatives as the probability of state 1 tends to zero or one. This
means that the marginal cost of information does not go to infinity, so that the DM
may choose to be fully informed. The marginal cost of information increases as η
decreases for µ (1|1) > 0.5.
In our dynamic setup, for the predictive distribution (prior belief) µt (·|at−1) given
history at−1, we define the conditional information cost in period t of acquiring infor-



































where µt (·|at−1) , µt (·|·, at−1) , and qt (·|at−1) satisfy (2). The unconditional information




























































Figure 1: Cressie-Read cost functions and their derivatives for different values of η for



































where the sequence of prediction distributions {µt (·|at−1)} satisfies (3). The Shannon
mutual information between aT and xT is the special case where β = 1 and H is the
Shannon entropy functon.
2.3 Decision Problem
We now formulate the dynamic discrete choice problem under RI as follows:
















where the choice variables are sequences of distributions {µt (xt|at)} and {qt (at|at−1)}
for t ≥ 1 satisfying (2) and (3). Here I (xt; at|at−1) is given by (6), and the expec-
tation is taken with respect to the joint distribution induced by π, {µt (xt|at)} , and
{qt (at|at−1)} .
9
Unlike the choice-based approach of MM (2015) and SSM (2017), the posterior-
based approach adopts posteriors instead of choice probabilities as a choice variable.
The parameter λ > 0 measures the shadow price of information in utility units. When
λ = 0, the problem is reduced to the standard Markov decision process formulation
described in Puterman (2005) and Rust (1994). When λ > 0, there is a tradeoff between
information acquisition and utility maximization. Acquiring more precise information
about the state of the system helps the DM make a better choice. But this causes
the control actions to be statistically more dependent on the state, which generates a
larger information cost.
3 Preliminaries and Basic Intuition
In this section we first present the solution in the static case related to CD (2013),
MM (2015), and CDL (2019a). We then show that the choice-based approach of MM
(2015) and SSM (2017) do not work for the general UPS cost functions. Finally we
study the two-period case and illustrate the difficulty of the dynamic model and our
solution approach.
3.1 Static Case
When T = 1 and uT+1 = 0, we obtain the following static problem according to the
posterior-based approach:
Problem 2 (static RI problem with UPS cost)
V (µ) ≡ max
q∈∆(A),µ(·|·)∈∆(X|A)





µ (x|a) q (a) , x ∈ X. (8)
Following CD (2013) and CDL (2019a), we rewrite this problem as




q (a)NaH (µ (·|a)) , V (µ) = V (µ)− λH (µ) (9)
subject to (8), where NaH (µ (·|a)) denotes the net utility of action a defined as
NaH (µ (·|a)) ≡
∑
x
µ (x|a)u (x, a) + λH (µ (·|a)) . (10)
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Notice that NaH (µ (·|a)) is concave in µ (·|a), but the problem in (9) is not jointly
concave in q and µ (·|·) due to the cross product term as pointed out by CD (2013). Thus
one cannot simply use the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to solve this problem. CD (2013)
instead propose a geometric approach from the convex analysis and derive necessary
and sufficient conditions for optimality. We first state some properties of the solution.
Proofs of all results in the main text are collected in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 Consider Problem 2. (i) The optimal posteriors µ (·|a) for all chosen
actions a with q (a) ∈ (0, 1) are independent of the prior µ ∈ ∆ (X) in the convex hull
of these posteriors. (ii) The optimal payoff for the static RI problem is given by
V (µ) = V (µ)− λH (µ) =
∑
x
µ (x) V̂ (x)− λH (µ) , (11)
where V̂ (x) is independent of the prior µ ∈ ∆ (X) in the convex hull of the optimal
posteriors µ (·|a) for all chosen actions a with q (a) ∈ (0, 1) . (iii) V (µ) is concave in
µ and for x = 1, . . . ,M − 1 and µ(x) ∈ (0, 1),
∂V (µ)
∂µ(x)
= V̂ (x)− V̂ (M). (12)
For the Shannon entropy case, V (µ) is convex in µ.
Part (i) is the LIP property discovered by CD (2013). Part (ii) can be best under-
stood using the geometric approach of CD (2013). Specifically, the optimal posterior





q (a)NaH (µ (·|a)) =
∑
x
V̂ (x)µ (x) ,
at the optimum. The value V (µ) is the height above µ (x) of the convex hull connecting
NaH (µ (·|a)) for all chosen actions a. The optimal posterior µ (·|a) is the tangent point
of V (µ) and NaH(µ(·|a)) for each a with q(a) ∈ (0, 1). The value V̂ (x) is the height of
the hyperplane containing this convex hull at the point with µ (x) = 1 and µ (x′) = 0
for all x′ 6= x. This value is independent of the prior µ in that convex hull. This result
does not appear in the literature and is critical for the analysis of the dynamic model.
Notice that we need at least two chosen actions to form a convex hull. If there is only
one chosen action a, then q (a) = 1 and the posterior is the same as the prior. In this















Figure 2: The net utility function and concavification.
Figure 2 is similar to Figure 5 of CDL (2019a) in the case with two states {x, x′} and
two actions {a, b} . Net utilities are represented by the two solid curves. The concavifi-
cation V (µ) is the concave envelope of these two curves. The optimal posteriors µ (·|a)
and µ (·|b) are given by the tangent points at which the hyperplane supports the two net
utility functions. The value V̂ (x) is given by the height of the hyperplane at the point
with µ (x) = 1. Both the optimal posteriors, V̂ (x) , and V̂ (x′) are invariant to changes
of µ (x′) within the interval (µ (x′|a) , µ (x′|b)) . If µ (x′) ∈ (0, µ (x′|a)], then q (a) = 1
and µ (x′|a) = µ (x′) . If µ (x′) ∈ [µ (x′|b) , 1], then q (b) = 1 and µ (x′|b) = µ (x′) .
Part (iii) of Proposition 1 shows that V (µ) is a concave function because it is
the concave envelope of net utilities. It is also differentiable and satisfies an envelope
condition (see Corollary 2 of CD (2013)). It is not clear whether V (µ) is concave as
it is equal to the difference of two concave functions by (11). In fact we can show that
it is convex if H is the Shannon entropy function. This issue poses a difficulty when
solving the dynamic RI problem.
To derive a tractable characterization and facilitate numerical solutions, we focus
on the following additive class of generalized entropy:




h(ν (x)), ν ∈ ∆ (X) , (13)
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where h is a differentiable concave function defined on [0, 1].
Shannon entropy, weighted entropy, Tsallis entropy, and Cressie-Read entropy all
satisfy Assumption 1, but Rényi entropy violates it. Under this assumption, we apply
Lemma 3 of CD (2013) to derive the following necessary and sufficient conditions:
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then the pair of µ (·|·) and q is
optimal for Problem 2 if and only if: (i) Equation (8) holds. (ii) There exists a function
V̂ : X → R such that for any chosen action a ∈ A with q (a) > 0 and for any x ∈ X,





[h(ν (x))− ν (x)h′(ν (x))] , ν ∈ ∆ (X) . (15)
(iii) For any unchosen action b ∈ A with q (b) = 0 and µb ∈ ∆ (X) such that










= V̂ (x)− V̂ (M) , (16)












Here the function I : h′ ([0, 1]) → [0, 1] is defined as I(y) = h′−1(y) where h′ ([0, 1]) is
the image of [0, 1] under h′. Moreover, the function V̂ (x) defined in (14) satisfies (11).
Condition (ii) shows that the right-hand side of equation (14) is independent of
any chosen action a and hence can be defined as a function V̂ (x). Condition (iii) is
a critical sufficient condition for optimality and helps determine the consideration set
(CDL (2019a)).
To understand this proposition, consider the special case of Shannon entropy. Then
we have h (ν (x)) = −ν (x) ln ν (x) and f (ν) = 1 for any ν ∈ ∆ (X) . Equation (14)
becomes
V̂ (x) = u(x, a)− λ ln(µ(x|a)) if q (a) > 0,









, if q (a) > 0.
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Plugging this equation into (8) yields
V̂ (x) = −λ ln
[
µ(x)∑




µ(x|a) = µ(x) exp (u (x, a) /λ)∑
a′ q (a
′) exp (u (x, a′) /λ)
if q (a) > 0.
By (11) we can derive the value function












It can be easily shown that condition (iii) is equivalent to the following condition
in CD (2013) and CDL (2019a) in the Shannon entropy case:∑
x
µ (x|a) exp (u (x, b) /λ)





µ(x) exp (u (x, b) /λ)∑
a′ q (a
′) exp (u (x, a′) /λ)
]
≤ 1,
for any chosen a with q (a) > 0 and any unchosen b ∈ A.
Motivated by the Arimoto-Blahut algorithm, we use the following algorithm to solve
for the optimal q (·) and µ (·|·) : 6
1. Initialize f(a) ∈ R and q ∈ ∆ (A) with q(a) > 0 for all a ∈ A.



























[h(µa(x))− µa(x)h′(µa(x))]→ f (a) .
6Our algorithm and the Arimoto and Blahut algorithm are related to the general block coordinate
descent method in the mathematics literature. See Bertsekas (2016) for a convergence analysis. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to provide a convergence proof for our specific application.
7In applications we allow I to be well defined in extended domain R and extended image R+.
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µa(x) q(a)→ q (a) . (20)









7. Find µb ∈ ∆ (X) that satisfies (16). Check whether (17) is satisfied, where V̂ (x)
is the converged value obtained in Step 6.
When a fixed point q+ = q is obtained, either q+(a) = q(a) ∈ (0, 1] or q+(a) =
q(a) = 0. In the first case, action a is chosen and hence
∑
x µ
a(x) = 1 by (20). That




a(x) ≤ 1 for the iteration in (20) to converge. Step 7 checks the
sufficient condition (17) in Proposition 2. To implement this step, we use (19) to

















, x = 1, ...,M − 1.
We use these M − 1 equations together with
∑M
x=1 µ
b (x) = 1 to numerically solve







3.2 Failure of the Choice-based Approach
MM (2015) and SSM (2017) solve RI problems with the Shannon entropy cost using
the choice-based approach. To understand this approach, we notice that Problem 2 for
the Shannon entropy case can be rewritten as














p (a|x)µ (x) , a ∈ A. (22)
Let F (p, q) denote the objective function in (21). We can verify that F (p, q) is jointly
concave in (p, q) . Blahut (1972, Theorem 4) establishes the following result:
Lemma 1 Let p ∈ ∆ (A|X) be fixed. Then maxq∈∆(A) F (p, q) is a concave optimiza-
tion problem and the optimal solution is given by q (a) =
∑
x µ (x) p (a|x) .
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F (p, q) . (23)
Taking first-order conditions with respect to p and q yields the choice-based charac-
terization as in MM (2015) and CDL (2019a). CDL (2019a) also provide sufficient
conditions for optimality.
To illustrate why the choice-based approach may not work for general UPS cost
functions, we let H be the weighted entropy. Then the cost function becomes
CH(µ, µ(·|·), q) =
∑
x,a








Following the choice-based approach described above, we define









One can check that Lemma 1 does not hold in general so that the static RI problem
is not equivalent to the unconstrained problem in (23) for general UPS cost functions.
Similarly, Lemma 2 in SSM (2017) also fails for general UPS cost functions in dynamic
RI models. Thus the coordinate-wise first-order conditions for p and q cannot be used
to characterize the solutions to dynamic RI problems.
3.3 Two-Period Case
As a prelude for our dynamic analysis we study the two-period case with T = 2 and
uT+1 = 0. We write the objective function as
J (q1, µ1 (·|·) , q2, µ2 (·|·))














































π (x2|x1, a1)µ1 (x1|a1) , a1 ∈ A, x2 ∈ X. (26)
Problem 3 Choose q1 ∈ ∆ (A) , q2 (·|·) ∈ ∆ (A|A) , µ1 (·|·) ∈ ∆ (X|A) , and µ2 (·|·) ∈
∆ (X|A2) to solve
max J (q1, µ1 (·|·) , q2, µ2 (·|·))
subject to (24), (25), and (26).
We solve Problem 3 by dynamic programming using the prior/predictive distribu-
tion as the state variable. First consider the RI problem in period 2 conditional on the
history of chosen action a1 with q1 (a1) > 0 :










− λH (µ2 (·|a1)) (27)





















The choice variables are µ2 (·|·, a1) ∈ ∆ (X|A) and q2 (·|a1) ∈ ∆ (A) . Taking the pre-
dictive distribution µ2 (·|a1) as the prior at history a1, we view this problem as a static
RI problem and apply Lemma 3 in CD (2013) to characterize the solution in period 2.
As in Proposition 1, we can show that
V2 (µ2 (·|a1)) = V 2 (µ2 (·|a1))−λH (µ2 (·|a1)) =
∑
x2
µ2 (x2|a1) V̂2 (x2|a1)−λH (µ2 (·|a1)) ,
(28)
where V 2 (µ2 (·|a1)) is concave in µ2 (·|a1).
By dynamic programming, the problem in period 1 is to choose µ1 (·|·) ∈ ∆ (X|A)
and q1 (·) ∈ ∆ (A) to solve:
V1 (µ1) = max
∑
a1,x1




q1 (a1)V2 (µ2 (·|a1))
subject to (24) and (26). The link between the problems in the two periods is through
the predictive distribution {µ2 (x2|a1)} that satisfies (26).
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Substituting (28) into (29) yields






G (µ1 (·|a1))− λH (µ1) , (30)
where we define the net utility associated with action a1 as
Na1G (µ1 (·|a1)) ≡
∑
x1
µ1 (x1|a1)u (x1, a1) + βV 2 (µ2 (·|a1)) + λGa1 (µ1 (·|a1)) .
In the above equation, we define
Ga (ν) ≡ H (ν)− βH
(∑
x
π (·|x, a) ν (x)
)
, a ∈ A, ν ∈ ∆ (X) . (31)
If π (·|x, a) is independent of a, then Ga (ν) will be independent of a.
By Proposition 1, V 2 (µ2 (·|a1)) is concave in µ2 (·|a1), and thus it is also concave
in µ1 (·|a1) by (26). Thus if Ga1 (µ1 (·|a1)) is concave in µ1 (·|a1) , then so is Na1G . For
the posterior-based approach to work, we impose the following condition:
Assumption 2 For any β ∈ (0, 1) and a ∈ A, the function Ga (ν) defined in (31) is
concave in ν ∈ ∆ (X) .
This assumption is satisfied for the Shannon entropy function (see the proof of
Corollary 1 in Appendix A). It may not be satisfied for all generalized entropy functions
because the difference of two concave functions may not be concave. While Assumption
2 seems restrictive, it plays an important role in establishing the recommendation
lemma in Appendix D and also ensuring concavity of the dynamic problem.
Under Assumption 2, we can then view the problem in (30) as a static RI problem
and apply Lemma 3 in CD (2013) to characterize the solution. In Appendix B, we
will provide a tractable characterization using Propostion 2 under Assumptions 1 and
2. We will also use this result to study dynamic RI problems with any horizon by
breaking down such problems into a sequence of static problems.
4 Main Results
In this section we analyze dynamic RI problems using dynamic programming, provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality, and describe a numerical algorithm
to solve these conditions.
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4.1 Dynamic Programming
To study Problem 1, let V T (µ1) denote the maximized value in (7) for T <∞. Choos-
ing the predictive/prior distribution as the state variable, we obtain a value function
V T : ∆ (X) → R. For T = ∞, we simply use V (·) to denote the corresponding value
function.
Endow ∆ (X) with the weak topology. Let V denote the set of all continuous
functions on ∆ (X) . Then V is a Banach space. Define a Bellman operator T on this
space as




q (a)µp (x|a)u (x, a)−λCH (µ, µp, q)+β
∑
a










π (·|x, a)µp (x|a) . (34)
By the principle of optimality, V and {V s}Ts=1 satisfy the Bellman equations V = T V,
V s = T V s−1, and
V 0 (µ) =
∑
x
µ (x)uT+1 (x) for T <∞.
Proposition 3 For Problem 1 with T = ∞, there exists a unique function V on V
that satisfies the Bellman equation V = T V. Moreover, limT→∞ V T (µ) = V (µ) for
any µ ∈ ∆ (X) .
Let the policy functions for the infinite-horizon Bellman equation be gq : ∆ (X)→
∆ (A) and gp : ∆ (X) → ∆ (X|A) .8 Then we can write the solution as q = gq (µ) and
µp = gp (µ) . The solution to the sequence problem in (7) can be generated as follows:
For t = 1,




π (x2|x1, a1) gp (µ1) (x1|a1) .







































Both the preceding infinite- and finite-horizon dynamic programming problems are
difficult to analyze. Like the special cases studied in Section 3, the optimization prob-
lems are not concave and the continuation value may not be concave. Thus it is also
difficult to solve the dynamic programming problems numerically. In particular, the
standard value function iteration method is inefficient and inaccurate because one has
to discretize the state space and optimize over a feasible set of µp (·|a) and q (a) for all
a that satisfy constraint (33).
The following result provides a characterization of the solution to the finite-horizon
dynamic RI problem in terms of first-order conditions.9
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the sequences of {qt(at|at−1)}Tt=1
and {µt(xt|at)}Tt=1 are the optimal solution to dynamic RI Problem 1 if and only if: (i)
Equations (2) and (3) hold. (ii) The following system of equations holds:
V̂t(xt|at−1) = vt(xt, at) + λh′(µt(xt|at)) + λft(µt(·|at), at), (35)
vt(xt, a









for any at with qt (at|at−1) > 0 and for t = 1, . . . , T , where 1{t<T} is an indicator

















π (x′|x, a) ν (x) h′
(∑
x




for ν ∈ ∆ (X) , a ∈ A, and t = 1, ..., T−1, with the terminal conditions V̂T+1(xT+1|aT ) =
uT+1 (xT+1) and fT (ν, a) ≡
∑
x [h(ν (x))− ν (x) h′(ν (x))] . (iii) For any unchosen ac-
tion at ∈ A with qt (at|at−1) = 0 and µatt ∈ ∆ (X) such that[
vt(xt, a
t) + λh′(µatt (xt))
]


















− ft(µatt , at)
)
≤ 1, (38)
9The infinite-horizon solution can be obtained by taking limits in Proposition 4 as T →∞.
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µt(xt|at−1)V̂t(xt|at−1)− λH(µt(·|at−1)), t = 1, ..., T. (39)
Like in the static case, equation (35) shows that V̂t(xt|at−1) is independent of all
chosen actions at. Condition (iii) in this proposition is a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for optimality, which is critical for determining the consideration set in each
period. This condition is similar to that of Proposition 2 in the static case.
When h (µ (x)) = −µ (x) lnµ (x) , we can verify that Assumption 2 is satisfied so
that we can apply Proposition 4 to derive a dynamic logit characterization for the
Shannon entropy case.
Corollary 1 The solution to dynamic RI Problem 1 with Shannon entropy satisfies
the following necessary and sufficient conditions: (i) For t = 1, . . . , T ,
µt(xt|at) =
µt(xt|at−1) exp (ṽt(xt, at)/λ)∑
bt







qt(at|at−1) exp (ṽt(xt, at)/λ)∑
bt












































= uT+1(xT+1). (ii) For any at ∈ A,∑
xt
µt(xt|at−1) exp (ṽt(xt, at)/λ)∑
bt
qt(bt|at−1) exp (ṽt(xt, bt, at−1)/λ)
≤ 1, (45)

















t−1) , t = 1, 2, ..., T. (46)
SSM (2017) provide a characterization for the Shannon entropy case using the
choice-based approach. Here we adopt the posterior-based approach. As shown in
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Section 3.2, the choice-based approach of SSM (2017) does not work for general UPS
cost functions beyond Shannon entropy.
As discussed in Section 3.1, the first-order characterization is useful for numerical
analysis. Because the solution is generally history dependent for the dynamic case,
numerical analysis is complicated and even infeasible for the infinite-horizon case. To
simplify dynamic solutions, we turn to a Markovian characterization.
4.2 Markovian Solution
We define the following notion of Markovian solutions.
Definition 1 An optimal solution to dynamic RI Problem 1 is Markovian if, for any
two different histories at−1 and {bt−2, at−1} reached with positive probabilities and any
t = 1, 2, ..., T , the implied predictive distributions satisfy µt(xt|at−1) = µt(xt|at−1, bt−2).
Intuitively, the predictive distribution is the state variable in the posterior-based
dynamic programming problem. If this state variable is history independent, then the
optimal solution must also be history independent. We thus have the following result.
Proposition 5 For a Markovian solution to dynamic RI Problem 1, the posterior
distribution µt (xt|at) , the choice rule pt(at|xt, at−1), and the default rule qt(at|at−1)





pt(at|xt, at−1), and qt(at|at−1), respectively, for any t = 1, ..., T .
By Definition 1 and Proposition 5, we can simply write µt+1 (xt+1|at), µt (xt|at) ,




, and qt (at|at−1) , respectively. We can













for any at−1 leading to at with positive probabilities.
We say that a solution to the dynamic RI problem in (7) is interior if qt(at|at−1) > 0
for any action at ∈ A and any history at−1, t ≥ 1. The following result shows that any
interior solution is Markovian.
Proposition 6 An interior solution to dynamic RI Problem 1 is Markovian, for which
the optimal posterior distribution µt (xt|at) takes the form µt (xt|at) for any t ≥ 1.
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Now we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for Markovian solutions, which
may not be interior, using the posterior-based approach. This result generalizes Propo-
sition 3 and Lemma 6 of SSM (2017) to allow corner solutions and UPS cost functions.






and {qt (at|at−1)} are a Markovian solution to dynamic RI Problem 1 if and only if:
(i) The following system of equations holds: (47), (48),
V̂t(xt|at−1) = vt(xt, at) + λh′(µt(xt|att−1)) + λft(µt(·|att−1), at), (49)









for any at with qt (at|at−1) > 0 and for t = 1, . . . , T , with the terminal condition
V̂T+1(xT+1|aT ) = uT+1 (xT+1), where 1{t<T} and ft are defined in Proposition 4. (ii)
For any unchosen action at ∈ A with qt (at|at−1) = 0 and µatt ∈ ∆ (X) such that
[vt(xt, at) + λh
′(µatt (xt))]− [vt(M,at) + λh′(µatt (M))] = V̂t (xt|at−1)− V̂t (M |at−1) ,









− ft(µatt , at)
)
≤ 1, (51)




µt(xt|at−1)V̂t(xt|at−1)− λH(µt(·|at−1)), t = 1, ..., T. (52)
When h (µ (x)) = −µ (x) lnµ (x), the above proposition reduces to the Shannon
entropy case studied by SSM (2017). We can easily modify Corollary 1 to state a
Markovian logit solution. We omit the details here. Notice that not every dynamic RI
problem admits an optimal Markovian solution. We have solved numerical examples
to illustrate this point for the Shannon entropy case. This result is available upon
request.
4.3 Numerical Methods
The conditions presented in Proposition 7 are a system of nonlinear difference equa-
tions, which is nontrivial to solve both analytically and numerically. To solve this
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system numerically, we extend the forward-backward Arimoto-Blahut algorithm pro-
posed by Tanaka, Sandberg, and Skoglund (2018) to our dynamic RI model with UPS
costs. We present the algorithm in Appendix C. Here we sketch the key idea.
We classify the difference equations in Proposition 7 into two groups. Equation
(48) forms the first group, which characterizes the evolution of the state variable











, {vt(xt, at)} ,
and {V̂t(xt|at−1)}.












µt+1(xt+1, at) > 0. (54)
Notice that the two µt+1 (xt+1|at) defined in (54) and (48) may not be identical even if
we use the same notation.
Clearly, µt+1 (xt+1|at) defined in (48) satisfies (54). But conversely µt+1(xt+1|at)
defined in (54) may not satisfy (48) unless µt(·|att−1) is the same for any two different
actions at−1 and bt−1 reaching the same at. The latter property can be satisfied if the
transition matrix π(·|·, a) is invertible for any a ∈ A. Under this condition we can use
(48) to easily prove that for a Markovian solution µt(·|at, at−1) = µt(·|at, bt−1) for any
two different actions at−1 and bt−1 reaching at.







rules {qt (at|at−1)} is known, equations (53) and (54) in the first group can be solved
forward in time to obtain a sequence of predictive distributions {µt+1 (xt+1|at)} . On
the other hand, if the solution for {µt+1 (xt+1|at)} is known, the equations in the second
group, which can be viewed as Bellman equations, can be solved backward in time.






and {qt (at|at−1)} . We solve the two groups of equations iteratively until convergence
and check whether (48) is satisfied. We choose (53) and (54) instead of (48) at each
iteration because (53) and (54) ensure µt+1 (xt+1|at) to be always history independent,
but (48) may generate µt+1 (xt+1|at) that depends on at−1 before convergence.
We will use the above algorithm to solve some numerical examples in the next
section. Whenever a Markovian solution exists, our algorithm will find such a solution.
We can design a similar algorithm for the history-dependent solution in Proposition 4.
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This algorithm becomes complicated for long-horizon problems as the history increases
with the horizon and becomes infeasible under infinite horizon.
5 Applications
In this section we apply our results to a matching state problem often studied in the
literature (SSM (2017), CD (2013) and CDL (2019a)). This problem can be used to
describe many economic decisions, e.g., consumer choices, project selection, and job
search. Suppose that X = A and the utility function satisfies u (xt, at) = 1 if xt = at;
and u (xt, at) = 0, otherwise. We assume that the transition kernel is independent of
actions in Section 5.1 as in SSM (2017) and allow it to depend on actions in Section 5.2.
For simplicity we also assume that |X| = |A| = 2 and µ1 (x1 = 1) = 0.5.10 We adopt
the Cressie-Read entropy in (5) and compare the solution with that in the Shannon
entropy case.11
5.1 Transition Kernel Independent of Actions
As in SSM (2017), we assume π (xt+1|xt, at) = γ whenever xt+1 6= xt for any at ∈ A.
We use this example to illustrate that rationally inattentive behavior exhibits status
quo bias over a short horizon, but not over an infinite horizon. Moreover, the infinite-
horizon behavior exhibits inertia. As a benchmark, the optimal solution for the case
without information cost (λ = 0) is to choose an action to match the state in each
period.
With information cost λ > 0, we first consider the interior Markovian solution in
the infinite-horizon stationary case, in which pt (at|xt, at−1) , qt (at|at−1) , and µt (xt|at)
do not depend on time. By equations (2) and (3), we have
q (1|1)µ (2|1) + q (2|1)µ (2|2) = (1− γ)µ (2|1) + γµ (1|1) .
By payoff symmetry µ (1|1) = µ (2|2) and q (1|1) = q (2|2) . Then we obtain
q (at = 1|at−1 = 1) = q (at = 2|at−1 = 2) = 1− γ,
as long as µ (2|1) 6= µ (1|1) . By prior symmetry the initial default rule satisfies q1 (a1 = 1) =
1/2.
10Our algorithm works for larger state and action spaces.
11We verify that Assumptions 1 and 2 and all conditions in Proposition 7 are satisfied in all our
numerical examples in this section.
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Using the forward-backward algorithm, we numerically solve for the whole transi-
tion path. We can verify the above interior solution and find that there is no transition
in this example. In particular, the solution immediately reaches the stationary case in
period 2.
Our solution above verifies part 1 of Proposition 5 in SSM (2017), which considers
more general payoff functions and transition probabilities in the Shannon entropy case.
The DM’s choices exhibit inertia. That is, when the exogenous state is more persistent,
the DM’s choice behavior is also more persistent. For our example, they have the same
persistence 1− γ.
It is more interesting to analyze the finite-horizon solution. SSM (2017) study
the two-period case with Shannon entropy and their Proposition 4 shows that when
γ is sufficiently small, q2 (1|1) = q2 (2|2) = 1 and Pr (a1 = a2) = 1. That is, if the
probability of changing states is sufficiently small, the DM’s behavior exhibits status
quo bias in the sense that he acquires information only in the first period and relies on
that information in both periods. Through extensive numerical experiments, we find
that this result does not hold in the infinite-horizon case. In particular, we always have
the interior solution described above for any γ ∈ (0, 1) given µ1 (x1 = 1) = 0.5.
The intuition behind the above result is the following. In the two-period case,
when γ is sufficiently small, the DM believes that any state in period 1 is more likely
to remain the same in period 2. Thus the DM does not want to acquire new information
and just follows the first period choice. However, when the horizon becomes longer,
future states are more likely to switch. In particular, the switching probability is given
by 1 − (1− γ)T , which increases to 1 for γ ∈ (0, 1) as T → ∞. Thus it is more
valuable to acquire new information when the decision horizon is longer. But when the
decision horizon is sufficiently short, the DM will not acquire any information, e.g., in
the terminal period.
Figure 3 illustrates the analysis above for different values of the curvature parameter
η for the Cressie-Read entropy. We set T = 10, µ1 (x1 = 1) = 0.5, λ = 1, γ = 0.04,
u11 = 0, and β = 0.8. For the baseline Shannon entropy case with η = 1, we find that
q1 (a1 = 1) = 1/2 by symmetry and
qt (at = 2|at = 2) = qt (at = 1|at−1 = 1) =

0.96 for t = 2, 3, ..., 7,
0.9858 for t = 8,
1 for t = 9, 10.
Thus the status quo bias behavior occurs starting from period 9. The left panel of Fig-
ure 3 presents the paths of pt (at = 1|xt = 1, at−1 = 1) and pt (at = 1|xt = 1, at−1 = 2) .
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Figure 3: Choice probabilities and default rules for different values of η. Parameter
values are T = 10, µ1(0) = 0.5, π(xt+1|xt, at) = γ = 0.04 if xt+1 6= xt, β = 0.8, and
λ = 1.
At time t = 1, they are the same because a0 is not present. Then pt (at = 1|xt = 1, at−1 = 1)
increases to 1 and pt (at = 1|xt = 1, at−1 = 2) decreases to zero, consistent with the in-
ertia behavior shown in Proposition 5 of SSM (2017). We also find that, when T →∞,
there is no terminal time and qt (at = 1|at−1 = 1) = 0.96 = 1− γ for all t ≥ 2.
Next we consider solutions when η 6= 1. We find that the status quo bias behavior
occurs earlier when η is smaller. Moreover, the state dependent choice probabilities
pt (at = xt|xt, at−1) decrease as η decreases. The intuition follows from Figure 1 pre-
sented in Section 2.2. When η is smaller, the marginal cost of information is larger
so that the DM has less incentive to acquire new information. Then the DM is more
likely to make mistakes and stick to the old information.
Our analysis indicates that it is rational inattention combined with the short horizon
that generates status quo bias. This bias does not exist under infinite horizon. But
the inertia behavior exists in both finite- and infinite-horizon settings. Moreover, the
timing of status quo bias depends on the marginal cost of information, which depends
on the specification of the information cost function.
5.2 Transition Kernel Depends on Actions
We now show that the results are very different when the state transition kernel depends
on actions. For simplicity, assume that π (xt+1|xt, at) = α ∈ [0, 1] if xt+1 = at, for t ≥ 1.
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That is, the probability that the state in the next period confirms the current action is
equal to α and is independent of the current state. We use this example to show that
status quo bias can persist in the long run and confirmation bias and belief polarization
can also arise.
Notice that the optimal solution in the case without information cost (λ = 0)
is always to choose an action to match the state in each period as in the previous
subsection. Next consider the two-period case with costly information acquisition (λ >
0).
Proposition 8 Consider the two-period RI model with Shannon entropy. Let u3 = 0,
β = 1, and π (xt+1|xt, at) = α ∈ [0, 1] whenever xt+1 = at. Let α∗ ≡ exp(1/λ)exp(1/λ)+1 and
α∗∗ ≡ 1
exp(1/λ)+1
. Then the solution satisfies q1 (1) = 1/2 and Pr (a2 = a1) = 1 for
α > α∗ and q1 (1) = 1/2 and Pr (a2 6= a1) = 1 for α < α∗∗. For α ∈ (α∗, α∗∗) , the
solution is interior with
q2 (1|1) = q2 (2|2) =
α (exp (1/λ) + 1)− 1
exp (1/λ)− 1
.
This proposition shows that the status quo bias can emerge for reasons other than
those discussed in the previous subsection. In particular, if α is sufficiently large, the
DM believes that there is a high probability that x2 confirms a1 and thus he does not
reverse his decision. But if α is sufficiently small, he reverses his decision.
Using numerical methods, we find that the solutions for any T > 2 are similar to
those for T = 2. This result is different from the case in which the state transition
kernel is independent of actions. In that case the status quo bias does not occur under
infinite horizon because the probability that the state will eventually switch is equal
to 1. By contrast, for the model in this subsection, the state transition probability is
independent of the current state, but dependent on the current action. If the probability
that the state in the next period matches the current action is sufficiently high, the
DM will not reverse his initial decision in that Pr (at = a1) = 1 for all t > 1. On the
other hand, if this probability is sufficiently low, the DM will reverse his initial decision
forever in that Pr (at = a
′
1) = 1 for all t > 1 and a
′
1 6= a1.
We are unable to derive an analytical result similar to Proposition 8 for general UPS
cost functions. We thus solve numerical examples using Cressie-Read entropy. Figure
4 illustrates the transition dynamics for different values of η. We set the parameter
values T = 10, λ = 1, β = 0.8, u11 = 0 and α = 0.7. We find that there is no transition


































































Figure 4: Choice probabilities and default rules for different values of η. Parameter
values are T = 10, µ1(0) = 0.5, π(xt+1|xt, at) = α = 0.7 if xt+1 = at, β = 0.8, and
λ = 1.
we have Pr (a2 = a1) = 1 for η = 0.2. For η = 1 and 1.3, the solutions are interior, but
η = 0.2 generates a corner solution. The difference in η is also reflected in the initial
choice probabilities p1 (a1 = 1|x1 = 1) . Figure 4 shows that p1 (a1 = 1|x1 = 1) declines
as η decreases. For a smaller value of η, the marginal cost of information is larger and
the DM has less incentive to acquire new information. Thus the DM is more likely to
make mistakes.
There is a positive feedback between beliefs and actions in the model of this sub-
section. When the DM believes that the state in the next period is sufficiently likely
to be consistent with the DM’s current action, he will choose the same action in the
next period in order to match the state. In this case he acquires information only in
period 1 and uses the same information in the future. Even though the realized state
in the future is different from his initial action, he still mistakenly sticks to the initial
chosen action because processing new information is costly.
The model here has implications for confirmation bias and belief polarization in the
psychology literature. Confirmation bias is the tendency to search for, interpret, favor,
and recall information in a way that confirms one’s preexisting beliefs or hypotheses.
This behavior happens in our model because the DM will stick to his initial choice if he
entertains a strong belief that the future state is likely to be consistent with his current
action. If there are more individuals, belief polarization may occur. Suppose that two
individuals with the same prior about the states have different beliefs about state
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transition probabilities. One believes the future state is more likely to be consistent
with the current action, and the other believes the opposite. Then after the same state
is realized over time, each one believes his own belief is correct. One individual will
choose the same action as the initial one. The other will always choose the action
different from the initial one.
6 Conclusion
We adopt the posterior-based approach to study dynamic RI problems and provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal solutions for the additive class of UPS
cost functions. We propose an efficient algorithm to solve these conditions and apply
our model to explain some behavioral biases. Because the class of cost functions con-
sidered in our paper can help explain some behavior that violates the predictions of
the RI models with the Shannon entropy cost, our approach will find wide applications
in dynamic settings. While it would be interesting to relax Assumptions 1 and 2 to
allow a larger class of information cost functions in dynamic models, it is still an open




Proof of Proposition 1: (i) It follows from Corollary 1 of CD (2013).
(ii) Let V̂ (x) be the height of the hyperplane at the point with µ (x) = 1 and
µ (x′) = 0 for all x′ 6= x. This hyperplane contains the convex hull spanned by the
optimal posteriors µ (·|a) for all chosen actions a with q (a) ∈ (0, 1) . Then V̂ (x) is
independent of the prior µ in that convex hull by part (i). If there is only one chosen
action a with q (a) = 1, then the convex hull is a singleton. By construction, V (µ) =∑
x µ (x) V̂ (x) . We obtain the desired result.
(iii) Let q∗i and µ
∗
i (·|·) be the optimal solution corresponds to any prior µi for
i = 1, 2. Let q (a) = θq∗1 (a) + (1− θ) q∗2 (a) for θ ∈ (0, 1) for any chosen action a. Then
we can derive












































≤ V (θµ1 + (1− θ)µ2) ,
where the first inequality follows from the concavity of the net utility NaH , and the
















1 (·|a) + (1− θ) q∗2 (a)µ∗2 (·|a)
= θµ1 (·) + (1− θ)µ2 (·) .
Thus V (µ) is concave in µ.
If µ is in the convex hull of the optimal posteriors for at least two chosen actions,
then V̂ is independent of µ in that convex hull. We then obtain (12). CDL (2019a) show
that the set ∆ (X) can be partitioned into sets of priors, each of which is associated
with a given consideration set. The derivative formula (12) applies to each set of priors
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and crosses boundaries of neighboring sets continuously. We can also apply Corollary
2 of CD (2013) to derive (12).
Finally consider the Shannon entropy case. Then Problem 2 can be reformulated
as in (21) and (22) (see MM (2015)). Let θ ∈ (0, 1) , µ, µ′ ∈ ∆ (X) , and µ∗ =









p∗ (a|x)µ (x) , q∗2 (a) =
∑
x
p∗ (a|x)µ′ (x) .
Since Shannon entropy is a concave function, we deduce that































≤ θV (µ) + (1− θ)V (µ′) .
Thus V (µ) is convex. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Recall that
NaH (µ (·|a)) ≡
∑
x
µ (x|a)u (x, a) + λH (µ (·|a)) . (A.1)
To apply Lemma 3 of CD (2013), we compute
∂NaH(µ(·|a))
∂µ(x|a)
= u(x, a) + λh′(µ(x|a))− u(M,a)− λh′ (µ(M |a)) , (A.2)










[h(µ(x|a))− µ(x|a)h′(µ(x|a))] + u(M,a) + λh′(µ(M |a)).
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We will show that conditions in Proposition 2 are equivalent to conditions (ED),
(CT), and (UB) in Lemma 3 of CD (2013). Condition (ED) is equivalent to
u(x, a)+λh′(µ(x|a))−u(M,a)−λh′(µ(M |a)) = u(x, b)+λh′(µ(x|b))−u(M, b)−λh′(µ(M |b)),
(A.4)
for any chosen actions a, b, and any x = 1, . . . ,M − 1.








[h(µ(x|b))− µ(x|b)h′(µ(x|b))] + u(M, b) + λh′(µ(M |b)),
for any chosen actions a and b.











[h(µ(x|a))− µ(x|a)h′(µ(x|a))] + u(M,a) + λh′(µ(M |a)),
(A.6)







∂µ(x|a) for any x = 1, . . . ,M − 1 .
Define function f as in (15). Then we can show that conditions (A.4) and (A.5)
are equivalent to the following condition:
u(x, a) + λh′(µ(x|a)) + λf(µ (·|a)) = u(x, b) + λh′(µ(x|b)) + λf(µ (·|b)), (A.7)
for any x = 1, 2, ...,M and any chosen actions a and b.
For any chosen action a, the height of the hyperplane passing through NaH(µ(·|a))







By conditions (CT) and (ED) in Lemma 3 of CD (2013), the expression above is
independent of any chosen action a. The height of this hyperplane at the prior with
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µ (x) = 1 and µ (x′) = 0 for x′ 6= x is









, x = 1, . . . ,M − 1,







By (A.2), (A.3), and (A.7), we obtain (14). Conversely, let (14) hold. Because V̂ (x) is
independent of chosen action, (A.7) holds so that conditions (CT) and (ED) in (A.4)
and (A.5) hold. Thus we have shown that condition (ii) in Proposition 2 is equivalent
to conditions (CT) and (ED). By construction, V̂ (x) satisfies (11).
By (A.2) and the definition of f, condition (UB) in (A.6) is equivalent to




≤ u(M,a) + λh′(µ(M |a)) + λf(µ(·|a)), (A.9)
where q (a) > 0 and µb ∈ ∆ (X) satisfies[




u(M, b) + λh′(µb(M))
]
= [u(x, a) + λh′(µ(x|a))]− [u(M,a) + λh′(µ(M |a))] , (A.10)
for x = 1, ...,M − 1. Notice that (A.9) and (A.10) imply




≤ u(x, a) + λh′(µ(x|a)) + λf(µ(·|a)), (A.11)
for x = 1, 2, ...,M. Conversely, suppose that (A.10) holds but (A.9) fails for some
chosen action a and some action b ∈ A. Then we can check that (A.11) fails too. Thus
we have shown that (A.11) is equivalent to condition (UB) in (A.6) given (A.10).













b(x) = 1, this inequality implies (17). Here µb satisfies (A.10), which is
equivalent to (16) using (14). Conversely, if (A.12) fails for some x, the previous
argument using (A.10) shows that it also fails for all other x. Hence (17) fails as well.
Therefore (UB) is equivalent to condition (iii) in Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3: We can easily verify the operator T satisfies the Blackwell
sufficient condition. Thus it is a contraction mapping. Since ∆ (X) is compact when
endowed with the weak topology, continuous functions on this space are bounded.
Thus V is a Banach space. We can verify that T maps a function in V into V by
the theorem of the maximum. By the contraction mapping theorem, there is a unique
fixed point V ∈ V such V = T V. Moreover, lims→∞ T sV 0 = V for any V 0 ∈ V. Thus
limT→∞ V
T = V. See Stokey, Lucas with Prescott (1989) for a reference of the cited
theorems here. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: The sequence of value functions satisfies the dynamic






























































Starting from the last period T, we apply the analysis in Appendix B recursively
by backward induction. We can then derive Proposition 4. Here we only outline the















































































By Assumption 2, Gat (µt (·|at)) is concave in µt (·|at) . The concave envelope V t+1 (µt+1 (·|at)) =∑
xt+1
µt+1 (xt+1|at) V̂t+1 (xt+1|at) is concave in µt+1 (·|at) by Proposition 1 and hence
in the posterior µt (·|at) by (3). Thus the net utility function NatG (µt (·|at)) is concave.
We can then use Proposition 2 to characterize the solution. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1: In the Shannon entropy case, h(µ(x)) = −µ(x) lnµ(x). We
first verify that Assumption 2 is satisfied so that we can apply Proposition 4. For any






















for all x1, x2 ∈ X.




is a jointly concave function of µ(x1) and µ̃(x2) for any
β ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore, G̃a is jointly concave in µ and µ̃.
For any θ ∈ [0, 1] and ν, ν ′ ∈ ∆ (X),
Ga (θν + (1− θ)ν ′)
= G̃a
(
θν + (1− θ)ν ′, θ
∑
x

















π(·|x, a)ν ′ (x)
)
= θGa(ν) + (1− θ)Ga(ν ′),
where the inequality follows from the definition of a jointly concave function. Thus
Assumption 2 is satisfied for Shannon entroy.





, aT ) = 1, for any chosen a













where 1 is an indicator function. Using this equation and (2), we can solve for
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V̂t(xt|at−1):











t) = vt(xt, a
t) − λβ1{t<T} and define Ṽt (xt, at−1) as in (44). Combining
the previous two equations, we confirm (40). Plugging the previous expression of
V̂t(xt|at−1) into (36), we confirm the recursive relation (43) for ṽt. Equations (41) and
(42) follow from the usual probability rules. Inequality (45) follows from (38) and (46)
follows from (39). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: By Definition 1, at history at−1 reached with positive















u (xt, at) (A.13)
−λCH
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As discussed in Section 4.1, the solution is a function of the prior/predictive distribution
µt (xt|at−1) independent of history at−2. Thus the optimal solution for qt (at|at−1) and













for any µt+1(xt+1|at) > 0. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 6: The first-period predictive distribution is the prior µ1.
The second-period predictive distribution is µ2(·|a1). Because the solution is interior,
q2(a2|a1) > 0 for any a2 ∈ A. Then all predictive distributions µ2(·|a1) for different a1
are in the interior of the convex hull spanned by optimal posteriors µ2(·|a2). By the
LIP property of CD (2013), µ2(·|a2) is independent of µ2(·|a1) and hence independent






which does not depend on a1. We can show that µt+1 (xt+1|at) takes the form of
µt+1 (xt+1|at) using the same argument by induction. Thus an interior solution is
Markovian. Moreover, the optimal posterior µt (xt|at) takes the form µt (xt|at) for any
t ≥ 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: For a Markovian solution, we directly apply Proposition
4 by replacing any history-dependent variable with its history independent version





satisfy these conditions. Then the optimal posterior {µt(xt|at)}
for problem (A.13) takes the form {µt(xt|att−1)} given the prior belief µt(·|at−1) for
any t ≥ 1. It then follows from (48) that the predictive distribution µt+1(xt+1|at) is
independent of the history at−1. Starting at t = 1, the prior is µ1 (·|a0) = µ1 (·) . By
induction we can show that µt+1(xt+1|at) takes the form µt+1(xt+1|at) for any t ≥ 1.
By Definition 1 the solution is Markovian. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: There are two types of solutions. By symmetry of the
problem, we first solve for a symmetric interior solution satisfying q1 (a1 = 1) = 1/2
and q2 (1|1) = q2 (2|2) = z. Interior solutions are Markovian. By Corollary 1, we
compute
Ṽ2 (1, 1) = Ṽ2 (2, 2) = λ ln [z exp (1/λ) + 1− z] ,
Ṽ2 (1, 2) = Ṽ2 (2, 1) = λ ln [(1− z) exp (1/λ) + z] ,
ṽ1 (1, 1) = ṽ1 (2, 2) = 1 + βαṼ2 (1, 1) + β (1− α) Ṽ2 (2, 1) ,
ṽ1 (1, 2) = ṽ1 (2, 1) = βαṼ2 (2, 2) + β (1− α) Ṽ2 (1, 2) .
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[exp (ṽ1 (1, 1) /λ) + exp (ṽ1 (1, 2) /λ)] .
Thus maximizing V1 is equivalent to maximizing(
ze
1







This is a concave function of z. The first-order condition gives
z =





exp (1/λ) + 1
< α <
exp (1/λ)
exp (1/λ) + 1
≡ α∗,
then the optimal solution is interior z ∈ (0, 1) . If α ≥ α∗, the solution is at the corner
z = 1. If α ∈ [0, α∗∗] , the solution is at the other corner z = 0. We then obtain the
desired result.
It remains to show that the corner solution in which q1 (1) = 1 is not optimal.




ṽ1 (1, 1) +
1
2
ṽ1 (2, 1) ,




ṽ1 (1, 1) +
1
2
ṽ1 (2, 1) < λ ln
1
2
[exp (ṽ1 (1, 1) /λ) + exp (ṽ1 (2, 1) /λ)] .
Since ṽ1 (2, 1) = ṽ1 (1, 2) for the above symmetric interior solution, we deduce that the
corner solution gives a smaller initial value than the above symmetric interior solution.
Similarly the other corner solution in which q1 (2) = 1 is not optimal. Q.E.D.
B Two-Period Case
In this appendix we study problem 3 by dynamic programming. First, consider the
problem in period 2 conditional on the history of a chosen action a1 :










































It follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that q2(·|a1) and µ2(·|·, a1) are optimal if and
only if: (i) Equation (25) holds. (ii) For any x2 ∈ X, and chosen actions a1 and a2
with q1 (a1) > 0 and q2 (a2|a1) > 0, we have









[h(ν(x))− ν(x)h′(ν(x))] , ν(x) ∈ ∆ (X) . (B.3)
(iii) For any unchosen action a2 and µ
a2
2 ∈ ∆ (X) such that
u (x2, a2) + λh
′ (µa22 (x))− [u (M,a2) + λh′ (µa22 (M))] = V̂2(x2|a1)− V̂2(M |a1)












Moreover, the value in period 2 satisfies
V2 (µ2 (·|a1)) = V 2(µ2(·|a1))−λH(µ2(·|a1)) =
∑
x2
µ2 (x2|a1) V̂2 (x2|a1)−λH (µ2 (·|a1)) .
(B.4)
Next consider the problem in period 1. By dynamic programming, we use (B.4) to
derive











q1(a1)µ1(x1|a1), x1 ∈ X. (B.6)
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µ1(x1|a1)u(x1, a1) + βV 2(µ2(·|a1)) + λGa1(µ1(·|a1)), (B.7)
where V 2 is given in (B.4), G
a1 is defined in (31), and µ2 (·|a1) satisfies (25).
It follows from Proposition 1 that V 2 is concave in µ2(·|a1), and hence concave in
µ1(·|a1) by (25). Moreover, Assumption 2 ensures the concavity of Ga1 in µ1(·|a1).
Therefore the net utility Na1G is concave in µ1(·|a1). We view the problem in period 1
as a static RI problem with the prior belief µ1. Applying Lemma 3 of CD (2013), we
derive the following result.
Lemma 2 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the pair µ1(·|·) and q is optimal for
problem (B.5) if any only if it satisfies the following conditions: (i) Equation (24) is
satisfied. (ii) There exists a function V̂1 (x1) such that for any chosen action a1 with
q1(a1) > 0 and for any x1 ∈ X,
V̂1 (x1) = v1(x1, a1) + λh
′(µ1(x1|a1)) + λf1(µ1(·|a1), a1), (B.8)
where
























π (x′|x, a) ν (x) h′
(∑
x




(iii) For any unchosen action a1 and µ
a1
1 ∈ ∆ (X) such that
[v1(x1, a1) + λh
′(µa11 (x1))]− [v1(M,a1) + λh′(µa11 (M))] = V̂1 (x)− V̂1 (M) ,







− f1(µa11 , a1)
)
≤ 1. (B.11)
















































h′(µ2(x2|a1)) [π(x2|x1, a1)− π(x2|M,a1)] ,
(B.14)
for x1 = 1, . . . ,M − 1.






V̂2(x2|a1)[π(x2|x1, a1)− π(x2|M,a1)]. (B.15)
Therefore, combining (B.14) and (B.15), we derive
∂Na1G (µ1(·|a1))
∂µ1(x1|a1)






=[u(x1, a1) + λh
















where v1 is given in (B.9).
Condition (ED) in Lemma 3 of CD (2013) is equivalent to
[v1(x1, a1) + λh
′(µ1(x1|a1))]− [v1(M,a1) + λh′(µ1(M |a1))]
= [v1(x1, b1) + λh
′(µ1(x1|b1))]− [v1(M, b1) + λh′(µ1(M |b1))] ,
(B.17)
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′(µ1(M |a1)) + λf1(µ1 (·|a1) , a1),
(B.18)
where f1 is given in (B.10). Then condition (CT) in CD (2013) is equivalent to
v1(M,a1) + λh
′(µ1(M |a1)) + λf1(µ1(·|a1), a1) (B.19)
= v1(M, b1) + λh
′(µ1(M |b1)) + λf1(µ1 (·|b1) , b1),
for any chosen actions a1 and b1.
The rest of the proof is the same as the proof of Proposition 2 with u, µ(·|·), and
f replaced by v1, µ1(·|·), and f1, respectively. After V̂1 is identified, the expression for
the optimal value follows from Proposition 1 directly. 
C Forward-backward Algorithm
The algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. Initialize f
(0)
t (at|at−1) ∈ R, q
(0)
t (·|at−1) ∈ ∆ (A) , and µ
(0)
t (·|at−1) ∈ ∆ (X) , with
q
(0)
t (at|at−1) > 0 and µ
(0)
t (xt|at−1) > 0 for any xt ∈ X, at, at−1 ∈ A, and t =
1, . . . , T . Set µ
(0)
1 (·|a0) = µ1 (·).
2. Choose a large integer K. For k = 1, 2, . . . , K until q
(k)
t (·|·) gets sufficiently close
to q
(k−1)




T (xT , aT ) = u(xT , aT ) + β
∑
xT+1
π(xT+1|xT , aT )uT+1 (xT+1) .
For t = T, T − 1, . . . , 1 do:




t (·|at−1), and µ
(k−1)
t (·|at−1)
as the input u, f(·), q(·), µ for the algorithm in the static case and use











• If t ≥ 2, compute
v
(k)












Forward path: For t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 do:


































t+1(xt+1, at) > 0,
where we set µ
(k)







t (·|·, ·) and V̂
(K)
t (·|·).
4. Check whether the converged solution satisfies (48).
For the infinite horizon case, we increase T until convergence.
D Signal-Based Formulation
Following SSM (2017), we consider the signal-based formulation. Suppose that there
is a signal space S satisfying |A| ≤ |S| <∞. At time t, the DM can choose any signal
about the state xt with realizations st in S. A strategy is a pair (d, σ) composed of
1. an information strategy d consisting of a system of signal distributions dt (st|xt, st−1) ,
for all st ∈ St, xt ∈ X t, and t ≥ 1;
2. an action strategy σ consisting of a system of mappings σt : S
t → A, which give
an action at = σt (s
t) , for t ≥ 1.
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Given an action strategy σ, we denote by σt (st) the history of actions up to time
t given the realized signals st. The state transition kernel π and the strategy (d, σ)





















1, s0) = µ1 (x1) is given. Using this sequence of distributions, we can com-
pute the predictive distributions µt (xt|st−1) and the posteriors µt (xt|st) and hence we
can define the discounted UPS information cost
∑T
t=1 β
t−1I (xt; st|st−1) , similar to (6).






















where the expectation is taken with respect to the joint distribution over sequences xT+1
and sT induced by the transition kernel π and the strategy (d, σ) .

















for all at, x
t, and at−1. Conversely, a choice rule {pt} of the form pt (at|xt, at−1) can
induce a strategy (d, σ) as described by SSM (2017).
We have the following recommendation lemma or the revelation principle similar
to Lemma 1 of SSM (2017) or Lemma 2 of Ravid (2019).
Lemma 3 Let Assumption 2 hold. Then any strategy (d, σ) solving the dynamic RI
Problem 4 generates sequences of posteriors {µt (xt|at)} and default rules {qt (at|at−1)}
solving Problem 1. Conversely any sequences of posteriors {µt (xt|at)} and default rules
{qt (at|at−1)} solving Problem 1 induce a strategy (d, σ) solving Problem 4.
Proof: We focus on the finite-horizon case with T < ∞. The result for the infinite-
horizon case can be obtained by taking limits as T →∞.
First, using the constructed {pt} from a strategy (d, σ) , we can define a sequence
of joint distributions µt (x
t, at−1) as in (1). The distribution induced by the strategy
(d, σ) and the sequence of distributions µt (x
t, at−1) give the same stream of expected




t−1I(xt; at|at−1), is not larger than that associated with (d, σ) . These informa-
tion costs can be computed using the posteriors and predictive distributions (priors)
induced by the corresponding joint distributions.





















































































































T )H(µT (·|aT )).(D.1)

















µt(xt|st)Pr(st|at), xt ∈ X.





Multiplying both sides by qt(a














Since the generalized entropy H is concave, we can similarly prove that∑
aT
qT (a




T )H(µT (·|sT )).
Applying the preceding two inequalities to the second and the third terms on the







We have shown that the discounted expected payoff from any strategy (d, σ) is not
larger than the value of the objective function in Problem 1 given the sequences of





is induced by the choice rule generated by (d, σ). Conversely, using the Bayes rule in
(4) to construct the choice rule {pt}, we follow the same argument as in SSM (2017)
to construct a strategy (d, σ) . Notice that the choice rule takes the form pt (at|xt, at−1)
so that the signal distribution dt depends only on (xt, s
t−1), but not on xt−1. The
discounted expected payoff from this strategy is identical to the value of the objective
function in Problem 1 given the sequences of posteriors and default rules. These two
relationships together imply the result. 
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Maćkowiak, Bartosz, and Mirko Wiederholt, 2009, Optimal Sticky Prices under Ra-
tional Inattention, American Economic Review 99, 769–803.
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